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Negotiating with Labor under Financial Distress
Abstract
We analyze how ﬁrms renegotiate labor contracts to extract concessions from labor. While anecdotal
evidence suggests that ﬁrms tend to renegotiate down wages in times of ﬁnancial distress, there
is no empirical evidence that documents such renegotiation, its determinants, and its magnitude.
This paper attempts to ﬁll this gap. Using a unique data set of airlines that includes detailed
information on wages and pension plans we document an empirical link between airline ﬁnancial
distress, pension underfunding, and wage concessions.
I. Introduction
The setting of wages and their renegotiation are crucial in determining labor outcomes. At the
individual ﬁrm level, wages determine the division of surplus between shareholders and employees,
while, economy wide, wages determine the supply of and demand for labor. In this paper, we analyze
the role that ﬁnance plays in renegotiations of labor contracts. While anecdotal evidence suggests
that ﬁrms tend to renegotiate down wages in times of ﬁnancial distress, there is no empirical
evidence that documents such renegotiation, its determinants, and its magnitude. This paper
attempts to ﬁll this gap. Using a unique data set of airlines that includes detailed information on
wages, beneﬁts and pension plans, we document an empirical link between airline ﬁnancial distress,
pension underfunding, and wage concessions.
Previous research has made important contributions in understanding the interaction between
ﬁnance and labor (Klasa, Maxwell, and Ortiz-Molina (2009), Matsa (2010)). Our paper adds to
this literature by focusing on the ability of ﬁrms to renegotiate labor contracts and in particular
the role that ﬁnance plays in such negotiations. To analyze this question, we focus on the threat
of ‘pension dumping’ in which ﬁrms threaten to default on their pension obligations during wage
renegotiation, thereby reneging on the promise of future retirement beneﬁts to workers.1
We ﬁrst show that airlines in ﬁnancial distress obtain wage concession from employees whose
pension plans are underfunded in that plan assets are insuﬃcient to cover outstanding liabilities.
Since employees with underfunded pension plans bear a higher cost when ﬁrms default, their outside
option in the event of default is reduced. Therefore, in bargaining, management can employ the
threat of ‘pension dumping’ to extract greater concessions from labor. As part of our identiﬁcation
strategy we then exploit the fact that pension plans in the U.S are partially insured by the Pension
Beneﬁt Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) – a federal corporation which protects the pensions of nearly
44 million American workers. While most deﬁned beneﬁts pensions in the U.S. are insured by the
PBGC, this coverage is limited. The maximum annual guarantee is determined by employee age
and was $30,978 for a 60 year-old employee in 2006. Since highly-paid employees with promised
pensions that exceed the PBGC guarantee stand to lose more when their pension is dumped, we
hypothesize that they will be more likely to make concessions during labor bargaining.
Our identiﬁcation strategy thus relies on a triple-diﬀerence, or DDD, speciﬁcation, with three
1See Hawthrone (2008) for a detailed description of the pension dumping phenomenon.
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levels of diﬀerences: (i) ﬁnancially distressed vs. non-distressed airlines, (ii) underfunded pension
plans vs. funded plans, and (iii) wages exceeding vs. those that are below the PBGC limit.
Consistent with our hypothesis, we ﬁnd that airlines that are ﬁnancially distressed can negotiate
down the wages of their employees whose pensions are underfunded and are not fully covered
by the PBGC guarantee. The magnitude of the triple diﬀerence estimator suggests that in such
renegotiation annual wages are reduced by between 9.3% and 11.2%. Since wages are generally
downward rigid (see e.g. Bewley (2000)), our results point to the importance of ﬁnancial distress
and reduced employee outside options in management’s ability to elicit concessions from labor.
Analyzing levels instead of the percentage change shows that in renegotiation ﬁnancially constrained
airlines with underfunded pension plans extract between $12,252 and $17,360 in annual wages from
employees not fully covered by the PBGC guarantee. Our results are robust to the inclusion of
year, airline, plan and airline-by-year ﬁxed eﬀects in addition to airline and employee controls.
One concern with the identiﬁcation strategy is that the DDD estimator is just picking-up
those employee groups that account for a larger share of the airline wage expense and hence have
larger margins to make concessions. For example, according to this alternate hypothesis, ﬁrms
in ﬁnancial distress can negotiate highly paid pilots’ wages downwards not because of the fact
that their pensions are not covered by the PBGC and hence their bargaining position is weaker
but simply because pilots have larger slack in which to make wage concessions. We address this
concern in two ways. First, we control throughout our analysis for the ratio between the wage of an
employee group and overall ﬁrm wage expenses and ﬁnd that our results are always robust to the
inclusion of the wage share variable. Second, we employ a placebo test to analyze the eﬀect of the
PBGC guarantee. Speciﬁcally, we compare wage renegotiation in airlines with deeply underfunded
plans (the treatment group) to wage renegotiation in similar employee groups in airlines with no
deﬁned-beneﬁts plans (the placebo group). We ﬁnd that amongst highly paid employee groups with
wages not fully covered by the PBGC guarantee, only those with a pension plan, and in particular
one that is underfunded, agree to accept wage reductions in renegotiation. In contrast, identical
highly paid employee groups employed in airlines without deﬁned beneﬁt plans do not accept wage
cuts in renegotiation. Thus, our results are not likely driven simply by some employee groups
making wage concessions for reasons unrelated to pension underfunding.
Earlier research on the intersection between corporate ﬁnance and labor economics has conjec-
tured that debt can be used strategically to control wage demands and that unionization levels are
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correlated with leverage at the industry level (Baldwin (1983), Bronars and Deere (1991), Dasgupta
and Sengupta (1993), Perotti and Spier (1993)). Similarly, using ﬁrm-level data, Hanka (1998) ﬁnds
that debt is negatively correlated with wages, employment and pension funding. Further, Hirsch
(1991) and Cavanaugh and Garen (1997) ﬁnd evidence that leverage is positively correlated with
unionization rates. However, while making important empirical contributions, the results reported
in these papers may be driven by an omitted variables bias in which industries with higher union-
ization rates also have higher debt capacity for reasons unrelated to management-labor bargaining.
This concern has been alleviated recently by Matsa (2010) who shows, using exogenous variation in
state-level labor laws, that once states adopt legislation that reduces union bargaining power, ﬁrms
with concentrated labor markets reduce debt relative to otherwise similar ﬁrms in other states.2
Consistent with Matsa’s results Klasa, Maxwell, and Ortiz-Molina (2009) provide strong evidence
that ﬁrms in more unionized industries hold less cash. While all of this empirical evidence hinges
on the notion that ﬁrms set their ﬁnancial position ex-ante in order to be in a better bargaining
position ex-post, there is no empirical evidence for the role that ﬁnancial distress plays in actual
ex-post wage renegotiations. Our paper adds to this literature by analyzing renegotiations ex-post,
identifying the conditions under which ﬁrms can successfully use their ﬁnancial position to extract
surplus from labor. In particular, our paper is the ﬁrst to provide micro-evidence on within-ﬁrm
wage renegotiations and their relation to ﬁnancial distress and pension underfunding.
Our paper is also related to Ippolito (1985) which was the ﬁrst to argue that ﬁrms may delib-
erately underfund their pension plan despite an associated tax disadvantage in order to deter their
labor unions from holding-up the ﬁrm. We provide direct evidence on the actual mechanism in
which airlines use underfunded pensions and the threat to dump those pensions in order to extract
labor concessions in and out of bankruptcy.3 More broadly, our paper adds to the growing empirical
literature on the role that labor plays in ﬁnance (see Agrawal (2008), Atanassov and Kim (2009),
Bertrand (2004), Chen, Kacperczyk, and Ortiz-Molina (2009a,b), Rosett (1990)).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II analyzes a simple contract-renegotiation
model based on Hart and Moore (1994). Our model generates three intuitive predictions which are
then tested in the data. Section III provides a case study analyzing wage renegotiation in Delta
2In contrast, a recent paper by Simintzi, Vig and Volpin (2009) provides international empirical evidence that
increases in labor protection are associated with decreases in leverage.
3Another related paper is Petersen (1992) who shows that ﬁrms decide to terminate over-funded pension plans in
order to transfer wealth from employees to shareholders.
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Airlines between 2003 and 2006 and the role that the threat of ‘pension dumping’ played in the
negotiations between management and Delta’s pilots. Section IV provides a description of our data
sources and summary statistics. We detail our identiﬁcation strategy in Section V. Sections VI
and VII describe the empirical analysis. Section VIII concludes.
II. The Model
This section develops a simple model analyzing labor contract renegotiation between a ﬁrm’s man-
agement and its employees in the spirit of Hart and Moore (1994). Our goal is to analyze the
conditions under which management can successfully renegotiate labor contracts with workers and
the payoﬀs obtained by parties in any successful renegotiation. The relative sizes of pension liabil-
ities, pension funding, and pension guarantees will play a key role in the renegotiation outcome,
as these are key in determining the value of labor’s outside option in negotiation. The model
provides three intuitive predictions: First, in order for management to successfully extract any
concessions from labor, the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial position must be suﬃciently poor. Second, conditional
on management extracting concessions from workers, greater pension underfunding reduces workers
post-renegotiation payoﬀ, but, third, the sensitivity of worker payoﬀs to underfunding is reduced
when government pension guarantees are larger.
A crucial component of our analysis is the role of the Pension Beneﬁt Guaranty Corporation
(PBGC) – a federal corporation which protects the pensions of nearly 44 million American workers.
While most deﬁned beneﬁts pensions in the U.S. are insured by the PBGC, coverage is limited.
The maximum annual guarantee is set by Congress and is determined by employee age – in 2006,
for example, the maximal annual guarantee for a 60-year old employee was $30,978. According to
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, if a ﬁrm seeks to terminate an underfunded
plan it must convince the PBGC that it is in ﬁnancial distress.4 If the PBGC agrees, it makes an
assessment of the size of the pension funding deﬁciency. If the plan’s assets are large enough to
cover all of the PBGC-guaranteed beneﬁts, then the PBGC mandates the plan administrator to
proceed to distribute the plan’s assets in the speciﬁc order described by law. After the distribution
is complete, the involvement of the PBGC in the termination is over. If the plan’s assets are not
4There are three criteria in which a distressed termination may be accepted by the PBGC: 1) liquidation in
bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings; 2) reorganization in bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings; and, 3) termination
is required to enable the payment of debts while remaining in business or to avoid unreasonably burdensome pension
costs caused by a declining workforce.
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suﬃcient to cover all of the PBGC-guaranteed beneﬁts, then the PBGC takes over the plan as
a trustee, transferring to itself all of the plan’s assets. From this point on, the investment and
administration of the funds is performed by the PBGC as the plan’s trustee, with the obligation
that it transfer to each plan beneﬁciary the guaranteed portion of her pension for life.5
A. Setup
Consider a ﬁrm that is run by management representing shareholders and that employs labor to
generate earnings. The model is comprised of two periods. In the ﬁrst period the ﬁrm is assumed to
have free cash ﬂow of C1 – representing cash owned by the ﬁrm net of all payments, including wages,
already made by the ﬁrm. In period 2, the ﬁrm will generate cash ﬂow of C2. To approximate
the situation faced by large publicly traded ﬁrms in the U.S., all cash ﬂows are assumed to be
non-expropriable.
Prior to period 1, workers and management are assumed to have signed a contract stipulating
that, conditional on continued employment at the ﬁrm at period-2, workers will obtain a wage of
W . As our focus is on contract renegotiation, the model does not analyze the ex-ante choice of W
(i.e. prior to period 1) but rather takes it as exogenous.6 For simplicity, we assume that C2 > W ,
so that the ﬁrm always has enough funds to pay its wage obligation in period 2.
In addition to their promised wage, workers are owed an amount P in deﬁned pension beneﬁts
in period 2. In period 1, the pension plan is funded by the ﬁrm to an amount F , where F can be
either larger or smaller than P . In the latter case, the pension plan is underfunded. To capture
in a simple manner the fact the ﬁrms are required to make mandatory contributions to pensions
plans, we assume that if labor’s pension plan is underfunded in period 1, then in period 2, after
having paid W in wages, the ﬁrm must use remaining cash balances to fully fund the pension.7
The level of funding at period 2 is then equal to min[C1 + C2 −W + F, P ].
To model the PBGC we assume that the government guarantees labor’s pension up to an amount
5Even when a plan is trusteed by the PBGC, there are workers that have accrued pension beneﬁts that are
smaller than the PBGC guarantee. These workers receive their accrued beneﬁts from the PBGC. The beneﬁciaries
that actually obtain the maximum guarantee are those with accrued beneﬁts larger or equal to the relevant PBGC
guarantee.
6The wage, W can be thought of as committed to ex-ante, prior to period 1, when realizations of C1 and C2 are
still uncertain. Then, at period 1, uncertainty is resolved, and parties decide whether to renegotiate the contract
based on the analysis presented herein. For a similar analysis pertaining to ﬁnancial contract renegotiation, see
Benmelech and Bergman (2008).
7Firms are required to make contributions to their deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans by the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974. See Rauh (2006a) for an analysis of the consequences of mandatory contributions for
ﬁrm’s investment policies.
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G.8 Thus, in the event that the pension plan is underfunded and labor does not obtain its full
pension beneﬁts of P , the government will fund the pension plan up to G. We assume that the
pension plan is ﬁrst funded by the ﬁrm’s available cash and only then funded by the government
guarantee.9 For ease of exposition, we further assume that G ≤ P and that G ≤ C1 + C2 + F .
The former assumption implies that the pension guarantee does not cover the full amount owed to
labor in pension beneﬁts, while the latter implies that the pension guarantee is not larger than the
ﬁrm value (gross of promised wages). Disposing these assumptions does not change our results at
all but increases the number of cases that need to be dealt with.
The timing of events in the model is quite simple. At period 1 management decides whether to
abide by its presigned labor contract or trigger renegotiation with labor. If management abides by
the contract and does not trigger renegotiation, the ﬁrm reaches period 2 and generates C2 in cash
ﬂow. It then pays out wages W and funds the pension plan as described above. To the extent that
the pension plan is not fully repaid, the PBGC provides its pension guarantee up to an amount G
as described above. Any remaining cash balances are then dispersed to shareholders.
If management does decide to trigger contract renegotiation, the outcome is based on Nash
bargaining, with management assumed to have bargaining power µ. As in Hart and Moore (1994),
we assume that management has human capital which is crucial for the ongoing success of the
project. In order to extract concessions from labor, management can therefore threaten to withdraw
its human capital, liquidate the ﬁrm, and dump the pension plan.10 Thus, in attempting to
renegotiate the labor contract, management is in essence threatening labor with the ﬁrm’s demise,
and with it, the inability of the ﬁrm to pay wages and pension beneﬁts. Labor’s outside option in
bargaining will then be determined solely by the available free cash ﬂow and pension funding at
period 1 (C1 and F , respectively) as well as by the size of the PBGC pension guarantee, G.11
8See Brown (2008) for a detailed description and account of the PBGC.
9This follows the mandate of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.
10Alternatively, one can assume that negotiation takes the form of an alternating oﬀer bargaining game, where
during negotiation, the ﬁrm’s continuation prospects continuously decline. The Nash bargaining outcome will then
corresponds to the subgame perfect equilibrium of the alternating oﬀer game. Thus, when the payoﬀs to initiating
the alternating oﬀer game are higher than those of abiding by the contract, triggering negotiation is indeed a credible
threat of management. For an analysis along these lines see Benmelech and Bergman (2008).
11As an alternate assumption one can assume that the ﬁrm is able to threaten labor that it will dump the pension
plan without being liquidated. However, with such an assumption, there must be an exogenous cost to pension
dumping, since otherwise pension dumping would always be optimal. This exogenous cost could stem from a loss of
ﬁrm reputation and an increased need in monitoring by workers.
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B. Contract Renegotiation, Pension Underfunding, and Pension Guarantees
In this section we solve for the equilibrium of the game described above. To do so, we analyze
under what conditions management decides to trigger renegotiation. Consider the following cases:
I. P ≤ C1 + F :
Under this scenario, pension underfunding (P − F ) is smaller than the period-1 cash balances
of the ﬁrm. Thus, even if the ﬁrm is liquidated, labor obtains its full promised commitment of
P . Management then obtains the diﬀerence C1 + F − P . While these two values represent the
respective outside options of the two parties, the surplus from continuing to period 2 is C2. Thus,
conditional on management triggering renegotiation, labor obtains P+(1−µ)C2. Since management
needs to pay labor P + W if it abides by the contract, it will prefer to trigger renegotiation when
(1−µ)C2 < W . Thus, if C2 is suﬃciently high, management prefers to abide by the contract since
labor obtains a relatively high fraction of the continuation rents. Importantly, in this region (i.e.
when P < C1 + F ) the payoﬀ to labor is independent of changes in the degree of pension funding,
F . If management abides by the contract, labor is paid in full, while if management renegotiates,
pension funding is irrelevant since (1) labor’s outside option is to obtain full payment on its pension
and (2) the surplus, C2, is also independent of funding status. We thus have:
Lemma 1. If P ≤ C1 + F , renegotiation occurs only when (1 − µ)C2 < W and labor’s payoﬀ is
independent of pension funding F .
II. C1 + F < P :
In this region, the period-1 assets of the ﬁrm are not suﬃcient to cover the ﬁrm’s pension obliga-
tions. This has two implications. The ﬁrst is that in renegotiation management’s outside option is
zero. The second is that since the pension plan is not fully funded, if the ﬁrm liquidates in period
1, the size of the pension guarantee may play a role in determining payoﬀs – it will aﬀect both the
surplus from continuing to period 2 as well as labor’s outside option in renegotiation. To analyze
these eﬀects, we divide this region into two cases:
IIa. G ≤ C1 + F < P :
In this region, labor’s outside option in renegotiation is to obtain C1 +F , all in the form of pension
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beneﬁts. Since the pension guarantee G is too low compared to the funds available for pension
repayment, it does not provide any beneﬁt to workers, and hence plays no role in determining
payoﬀs. Since the surplus from continuation is C2, labor will obtain C1 +F + (1− µ)C2 in renego-
tiation. Management triggers renegotiation therefore when C1 + F + (1 − µ)C2 < P + W . Thus,
since in this region C1 + F < P , renegotiation will occur when the ﬁrm’s future prospects, C2, are
suﬃciently low compared to the precontracted wage obligation, W . Indeed a suﬃcient condition
for renegotiation is (1−µ)C2 < W . If renegotiation does occur, labor’s payoﬀ decreases one-for-one
with reductions in pension funding, F : In this region, period-1 assets do not cover pension liabili-
ties and the pension guarantee is too low to be relevant. Thus, reductions in pension funding, F ,
are directly translated into reductions in labor’s outside option, C1 + F , and hence also into labor
payoﬀs. We thus have:
Lemma 2. If G ≤ C1+F < P , renegotiation occurs when (1−µ)C2 < W . If renegotiation occurs,
labor’s payoﬀ decreases one-for-one with reductions in pension funding, F .
IIb. C1 + F < G < P :
In this region, the pension guarantee G is comparatively high relative to the available period-1
assets of the ﬁrm. Because of this, labor’s outside option in renegotiation is to obtain a payoﬀ of G:
The ﬁrm’s period-1 assets do not cover its pension liabilities, implying that the PBGC funds the
diﬀerence between G and C1 + F . Further, because of the government guarantee, and in contrast
to prior cases, the surplus from continuation to period-2 is now C1 + C2 + F − G.12 Thus, if
management triggers renegotiation, labor obtains G+(1−µ)(C1 +C2 +F −G). Management will
decide to trigger renegotiation when G+ (1− µ)(C1 + C2 + F −G) < P + W . As in prior cases, a
suﬃcient condition for renegotiation to occur is (1− µ)C2 < W – i.e. that the ﬁrm’s prospects are
suﬃciently poor compared to its obligations to labor.
If renegotiation does occur, reductions in pension funding reduce labor’s payoﬀ, but less than
one-for-one. Indeed, as can easily be seen, a dollar reduction in funding reduces labor’s ultimate
payoﬀ by only 1 − µ. This is due to the eﬀect of the pension guarantee. Since the guarantee is
suﬃciently large, labor’s outside option in renegotiation is ﬁxed at G and protected from declines
in pension funding, F . Still, a decline in F reduces the surplus from continuation to period 2, and
12Recall that we assume for expositional simplicity that G ≤ C1 +C2 + F .
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labor bears a fraction (1− µ) of this reduction. We thus have:
Lemma 3. If C1+F < G < P , renegotiation occurs when (1−µ)C2 < W . If renegotiation occurs,
labor’s payoﬀ decreases by (1− µ) for every unit reduction in pension funding, F .
Combining Lemmas 1 through 3 provides the following three predictions:
Prediction 1. All else equal, the ability of management to extract concessions from labor in
contract renegotiation is decreasing in the strength of a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial position as proxied by ﬁrm
current and future cash ﬂows as well as its level of pension funding.
Prediction 2. If a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial position is suﬃciently poor to extract concessions from labor
in renegotiation, increases in pension underfunding will reduce labor payoﬀs.
Prediction 3. The sensitivity of post-renegotiation labor payoﬀs to pension underfunding will be
greatest amongst pension plans where the PBGC guarantee is relatively small compared to the
pension obligations.
III. Labor Negotiations and Pension Dumping in Delta Airlines:
A Case Study
In this section, we brieﬂy describe the negotiations between Delta Air Lines and the approximately
9,000 pilots represented by the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) that took place from 2003 until
late 2006. We argue that Delta’s ability to obtain substantial wage concessions from its pilots (and
from its workers in general) was largely due to their highly underfunded deﬁned beneﬁt pension.
This, together with the fact that the PBGC pension guarantee would cover a relatively small
fraction of the underfunding in the pilots plans, implied that pension termination meant billions of
dollars in potential losses for pilots.13
A. The Prolonged First Negotiation
In July, 2001, Delta and ALPA’s pilots signed a 5-years contract which would make Delta’s pilots
the highest paid in the industry and which included annual wage increases of 4.5%.14 However, as
13This description relies on information obtained from articles in the Wall Street Journal, the Atlanta Journal-
Constitution, the New York Times, the Associated Press, the Financial Times and the Dow Jones Business News.
14Three years later, in 2004, Delta pilots’ average wage was $209,330 while Northwest pilots – the second highest
paid in the industry – earned on average $169,208. Average wages of pilots in Continental, US Airways, United and
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a result of the downturn in the industry following the September 11th attacks, Delta asked ALPA
in April 2003 for a 22% cut in pilots’ hourly wages and the cancelation of the 4.5% annual raises
due on May 2003 and 2004. Delta executives argued that this cut was necessary for the airline
to remain competitive, especially since its two largest competitors, American Airlines and United
Airlines, recently obtained considerable wage concessions from their labor unions.
What followed was a series of oﬀers and counteroﬀers between Delta’s management and the
pilots? union. Delta’s initial bargaining position was not ideal. On the one hand, employee
pension plans were underfunded by approximately $4.9 billion, implying that pension termination
would be quite costly for labor. On the other hand, Delta’s balance sheet was much stronger
than that of American Airlines and United, making it more diﬃcult to extract concessions from
labor.15 As negotiations drew on, however, Delta’s condition deteriorated thereby enhancing the
ﬁrm’s bargaining position vis-a-vis labor.
By December 2003, ALPA was oﬀering a 9% pay cut plus the cancelation of the 4.5% increase
due on May 2004. Management rejected this oﬀer and by June 2004 was demanding a 30% reduction
in pilot compensation. The pilot union countered with an oﬀer to cut wages by 23%. By the end of
July, with Delta’s condition continuing to deteriorate, management answered with an increased pay
cut demand of 35%, amounting to $1.02 billion a year in pilot concessions. Finally, in November
10, 2004, Delta’s management and ALPA reached a deal involving a 32.5% wage cut, changes to
work rules that would increase pilots’ ﬂying time, a switch to a cheaper retirement plan for younger
pilots, and the freezing of the pilots’ pension plan.
In return, pilots received options on Delta stock as well as other proﬁt sharing arrangements.
Panel A of Table 1 displays detailed information on wages and pension plan funding status for
pilots and non-pilots for the years 2004, 2005, and 2006.16 Panel B of Table 1 shows the outcome
of the renegotiations. Consistent with strategic renegotiation, pilots – whose average wages were
much higher than the PBGC maximum guarantee – made wage concessions of 32.5%. In contrast,
non-pilot employees were mostly covered by the PBGC guarantee and hence agreed only to a much
smaller 10% wage cut.
American Airlines were $145,060, $132,715, $131,930 and $129,947, respectively.
15See The Wall Street Journal, July 23, 2003, “Delta Pilots Contract Talks Break Down.”
16Data sources are described in detail in the next section.
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B. The Second Negotiation
Four weeks after the $1 billion agreement, Delta’s management returned to the bargaining table
arguing that to avoid bankruptcy the pilots would need to agree to further concessions. The threat
of bankruptcy was particularly acute for labor, as at the time, the airline’s deﬁned beneﬁt pension
plans were underfunded by approximately $3.3 billion (Table 1).
In the ensuing months, Delta unsuccessfully sought additional concessions from its pilots, and
as a result, ﬁled for Chapter 11 on September 14, 2005. Upon ﬁling, Delta presented its unionized
pilots with a new compensation plan calling for further annual concessions of approximately $325
million which included a 20% pay cut. Further, in October of the same year, Delta received
permission from the bankruptcy court to halt pension payments to retirees.
By this time, Delta’s pilots were highly concerned that the carrier would opt to terminate
their deﬁned beneﬁt plan. Such termination would be quite costly for pilots – by the end of the
year, Delta’s estimated that its pension plans were underfunded by $4.6 billion. Further, because
of pilots? comparatively high wage and retirement beneﬁts, the PBGC beneﬁt guarantee would
provide them with little coverage in the event of termination. As a result of what appeared to be
a credible threat of plan termination, the pilot union agreed to re-open negotiations with Delta.
Central to the negotiations was the future of the pilot pension plan.17
In March 2006, Delta asked its pilots for additional concessions worth $305 million a year for
four years, including a 18% pay cut. ALPA’s counteroﬀer included concessions amounting to $140
million a year and a demand for a $1 billion note from Delta payable in case the pilot pension plan
was terminated. For the ﬁrst time during negotiations, Delta’s executives told the pilots that it was
likely that the ﬁrm would terminate their pension plan. Finally, in June 2006, Delta’s pilots ratiﬁed
a 3.5 year agreement on concessions that included cost savings of $280 million a year with a 14%
wage cut, reducing average pilot pay from $151,000 to just under $130,000 a year. Additionally,
the new contract paved the way for Delta to seek termination of the pilots’ pension plan. In
return, Delta promised the union a $650 million payment and a $2.1 billion claim convertible into
a yet-to-be-determined stake in the reorganized Delta.
17Indeed, during one of the hearings in bankruptcy court, an ALPA attorney said to his Delta counterpart that
“we’ll go out in the hall and get a deal if the airline would guarantee it would not terminate the pilot’s pension plan.”
(The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, December 6, 2005: “Judge Tells, Delta, Pilots to Work Out Diﬀerences”.)
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C. The Pilot Pension Plan Termination
On September 1st, 2006, Delta requested that the bankruptcy judge allow the ﬁrm to terminate the
pilots’ pension plan and to transfer its liabilities to the PBGC. The judge approved the termination
request on September 6th, thereby allowing Delta to avoid approximately $3 billion in payments
needed to bring the plan to full funding – Delta transferred $1.7 billion in assets to the PBGC to
cover more than $4.7 billion in beneﬁt liabilities. The PBGC estimated that out of the $3 billion
in underfunded pension liabilities it would be liable for $920 million, implying a loss of more than
$2 billion for the ALPA pilots. As Panel A of Table 1 shows, the pilots’ pension plans were more
underfunded – arguably strategically – than those of the non-pilot employees. As a result, post-
bankruptcy the pilots agreed to an additional wage concession of 14% compared to only 7.5% by
non-pilots.
IV. Data and Summary Statistics
This section describes the construction of our data set and displays summary statistics for the main
variables in our analysis.
A. Sample Construction
We use two main data sources to construct our sample: (i) the Bureau of Transportation Statistics
(BTS) data on individual airlines, and (ii) data on airlines’ pension plans from the Department of
Labor’s form 5500. We also supplement these data with information from Compustat and from
SDC.
A.1 Calculating Average Wages
Using the Air Carrier Financial Reports (Form 41 Financial Data) from the BTS, we obtain ﬁnancial
information as well as detailed data on airline employees and their compensation for large U.S.
certiﬁed air carriers. We use Schedule P-6 from the BTS’s Form 41 to obtain detailed information
on wages for diﬀerent job categories in airlines. Schedule P-6 provides operating expenses for air
carriers with annual operating revenues of at least $20 million. The diﬀerent job categories for
which annual wage information is available are: (1) General Management Personnel; (2) Flight
Personnel; (3) Mechanics & Maintenance; (4) Aircraft and Traﬃc Handling Personnel; and, (5)
Other Personnel. We use the BTS’s Schedule P-52 to calculate aggregate pilot wages, and then
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subtract this amount from the aggregate ﬂight personnel’s wages obtained from Schedule P-6 to
obtain annual aggregate ﬂight attendants wage.18 We thus divide the Flight Personnel group into
two separate subgroups – Flight Attendants and Pilots. This process yields annual wages for six
separate job categories which are used in our data analysis: (1) Pilots; (2) Flight Attendants; (3)
Mechanics & Maintenance; (4) Aircraft and Traﬃc Handling Personnel; (5) General Management
Personnel; and, (6) Other Personnel.
Next, we use Schedule P-10 from BTS’s Form 41 to obtain detailed data on the number of
employees per job category for the years 1990 to 2007. There are 15 diﬀerent categories that group
together employees with closely related jobs. We use the BTS Employment Categories Descriptions
to assign each of the 15 employee categories to one of the six job categories described above.19
For each of these six job categories we then divide total wages of the group by the number of
employees in that group to obtain the average wage per employee in each job category. As a result,
we obtain information on annual average wages per employee for the airline as a whole and for
each of the six BTS job categories. Finally, for each employee job category we calculate the annual
percent change and the annual dollar change in average wage per employee.
A.2 Airline Financial Data
We continue by collecting earnings data from BTS Form 41’s Schedule P-12. We deﬁne proﬁtability
as income before discontinued operations and extraordinary items plus depreciation and amorti-
zation divided by total assets. Using balance sheet data from BTS Form 41’s Schedule B-1, we
calculate leverage as total current liabilities plus long-term debt divided by total assets. We also ob-
tain industry data from the BTS on average aircraft fuel cost for airlines and industry proﬁtability.
Finally, using Compustat data we construct yearly airline market-to-book ratios.20
A.3 Pension Plans Data
We obtain available data on all deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans covering employees of US airlines.
Firms with deﬁned-beneﬁts pension plans are required to ﬁle Form 5500 with the IRS for each
plan. Using all ﬁlings of Form 5500 in the years 1992 to 2006, we identify all deﬁned beneﬁt plans
18Schedule P-52 contains operating expenses for each aircraft type for every carrier. By adding across aircraft types
for every airline, we construct an aggregated ﬁgure for pilots’ wages.
19See Appendix A for a detailed description of job groups and categories.
20We cannot construct market-to-book ratios for airline-year observations in which airlines are not publicly traded
ﬁrms.
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in the airline industry that have 100 or more active participants, and that are sponsored by a
single employer.21 We calculate the level of plan underfunding by subtracting the total assets of
the plan from the current liability of the total beneﬁts due to all plan participants.22 We deﬁne
a dummy variable for plan underfunding which takes on a value of one if a plan is underfunded
and zero otherwise. As we are also interested in analyzing the eﬀect of deep underfunding we
deﬁne underfunding dummies for underfunding levels larger than 10%, 15% and 25% of plan assets.
Appendix A provides further details on the construction of these variables.
We continue by matching each deﬁned beneﬁt pension plan to one of the six BTS job categories
(some plans are matched to more than one category as described below). This matching is then
used to relate pension plan information, such as pension underfunding, to our main dependent
variable, the percent change in average wage per employee in each job category. In most cases, the
match is straightforward since the pension plan includes the job title in its name (Pilots, Flight
Attendants, Mechanics, etc). A second category is one in which some pension plans are linked to
a speciﬁc labor union. In these cases, we analyze which of the airline’s job categories (out of the
six BTS categories) are associated with this speciﬁc union and calculate our dependent variables
accordingly.23 A third set of pension plans are speciﬁcally for non-unionized workers. For these
cases we calculate the average wage per employee using all job groups that do not have a separate
pension plan linked to a union. A fourth group of plans are “aggregate plans” in the sense that they
cover all of the ﬁrm’s workers without craft distinction.24 In these cases, we calculate the average
wage per employee for the ﬁrm as a whole. Finally, some airlines have only two plans: one for
pilots and the other for all other employees. A ﬁfth set of pension plans, therefore, are speciﬁcally
for non-pilots. In these cases we calculate the relevant average wage per employee associated with
the plan by aggregating all non-pilot job categories together.
Matching the BTS and the Form 5500 data and restricting our sample to plans that have at least
two observations, we end up with 559 plan-year observations corresponding to 14 diﬀerent airlines.25
21This last ﬁlter is important since in multi-employer plans it is not clear which ﬁrm actually carries out the labor
negotiations. Nevertheless, the vast majority of airlines’ deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans are single-employer plans.
22While other measures of underfunding exist, we use the common deﬁnition of underfunding used by the PBGC.
23For example, if a union includes both ﬂight attendants and mechanics within an airline, the average wage is
calculated as the sum of wages given to ﬂight attendants and to mechanics divided by the number of employees in
the ﬂight attendants and mechanics employee groups. We then calculate the annual percent change in wages per
employee for this “enlarged” group within the airline.
24Some ﬁrms have an aggregate plan on top of their craft plans, while other have only aggregate plans for their
workers (as is the case with United Parcel Services and Federal Express).
25There are three small airlines (Astar Air Cargo, Markair Inc. and ABX Air) for which the available data allows us
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Out of the 559 plan-year observations, 482 plan-year observations representing 12 airlines have
market-to-book data.26 We winsorize our dependent variable at the 0.5th and 99.5th percentiles
(0.5% per tail) and also exclude observations with a Market-to-Book or Leverage value that is more
than four standard deviations away from its corresponding mean. Six observations are dropped,
leading to a ﬁnal sample size of 476 plan-year observations spanning the years 1992-2006.
B. Data Characteristics and Summary Statistics
Panel A of Table 2 provides summary statistics on wages of airline employees. The average airline in
our sample has 45,663 employees (median 39,952) and wages account on average for 24.1% (median
24.9%) of operating revenues for the airlines in our sample. While the average wage across all
employees is $70,143 a year, there is a large dispersion in average wages across diﬀerent employees
groups. While the average wage of pilots is $125,203, ﬂight attendants and mechanics earn on
average $34,210, and $58,731, respectively. We also calculate wage shares for each of the employee
groups deﬁned as the ratio of wages of an employee group to the overall wage expenses of the
airline. Finally, Panel A of Table 2 provides summary statistics on the percent annual change in
average wages for each employee group which we use as our dependent variable in the regression
analysis. As Panel A shows, the average annual increase in wages per employee in our sample is
3.8% (median 3.8%). The standard deviation of 12.6% points to the high variability in annual wage
adjustments.
Panel B of Table 2 provides summary statistics for the explanatory variables used in our re-
gressions. Starting with the underfunding dummy variables, Panel B demonstrates that on average
55.7% of the plan-year observations show some level of underfunding, while 38.9%, 34.0% and 22.1%
of the plans are underfunded by at least 10%, 15% and 25% of the plan’s total assets, respectively.
The mean size (total assets) of an airline in our sample is $10.8 billion, and the average market-to-
book ratio, leverage ratio and proﬁtability are 1.25, 0.56 and 3.67%, respectively.27 About 15.5%
of our plan-year observations are linked to an airline in Chapter-11. As a measure of ﬁnancial
only to build a single observation per plan. They are excluded from the sample as most of our empirical speciﬁcations
include either ﬁrm or plan ﬁxed eﬀects.
26The 12 airlines in our sample for which we have market-to-book data are: Alaska Airlines, American Airlines,
Continental Airlines, Delta Airlines, Federal Express, Hawaiian Airlines, Midwest Airlines, Northwest Airlines, Trans
World Airlines, United Airlines, United Parcel Services and US Airways. Aloha Airlines and Shuttle Inc are dropped
as they do not have market-to-book data.
27Note that these averages are based on plan-year observations and hence the data is weighted by plan-year
observations per airline.
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diﬃculties we deﬁne a low cash ﬂow dummy that equals one for airlines in which cash ﬂow from
operations (income before extraordinary items + depreciation and amortization) plus cash balances
are less than their interest expense, and 0 otherwise.28 The average earnings plus cash balances are
$336.0 million and the average interest expense is $231.8 million. The low cash ﬂow dummy takes
a value of one for 29.6% of the observations.29
Another important variable in our analysis is the maximal annual pension guarantee provided
by the PBGC which provides monthly payments to retirees of terminated pension plans that were
underfunded at the time of termination. This payment, however, is capped at an amount that
varies by employee age. Indeed, as can be seen in Panel B of Table 2, 43.5% of the observations
have an average wage per employee that is larger than 1.5 times the maximum annual guaranteed
payment oﬀered by the PBGC for that year, and 33.8% earn more than twice the PBGC maximum
guarantee.30
V. Empirical Strategy
The wage structure of the airline industry, and in particular the clear disparity in pay levels across
job categories combined with the ﬁnancial diﬃculties and frequent bankruptcy ﬁlings of air carriers,
make the airline industry a natural setting to test the relation between ﬁnancial distress and labor
negotiations. Furthermore, the fact that most of the legacy carriers in the U.S. are highly unionized
and have traditionally oﬀered deﬁned-beneﬁts pension plans to their employees enables us to study
the strategic use of underfunded deﬁned beneﬁts pension plans in wage renegotiation.
In particular, the BTS data provides detailed information on aggregate wages and number of
employees in diﬀerent job categories which enable us to calculate the average wage in each of these
job groups. These data are a major improvement over the wage data that is available in other data
sets.31 Rather than providing aggregate wages to all employees in a ﬁrm, the BTS data provides
intra-ﬁrm information across employee group categories. This detailed group speciﬁc intra-ﬁrm
information lies at the heart of our identiﬁcation strategy.
28See Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein (1994), and Benmelech and Bergman (2008) for similar approaches.
29Our analysis is robust to other deﬁnitions of low cash ﬂow or low proﬁtability.
30The benchmark annual guarantee used in this calculation is for a worker that retires at age 65. Table B1 provides
detailed information on the PBGC maximum guarantee.
31For example, total wages is not always available in standard data sets. In Compustat many ﬁrms do not report
wages as a separate item and instead lump them with other expenses as part of Selling, General and Administration
(SG&A).
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A. Identiﬁcation
As shown in the model in Section II, an airline is more likely to obtain concessions from labor
when its ﬁnancial condition is suﬃciently poor. Further, conditional on renegotiation occuring, the
model shows that employee concessions will be larger when the underfunding of their pension plan
is greater, as in these cases employees’ outside option is lower. Finally, the model predicts that the
eﬀect of underfunding on wage concessions will be larger amongst plans where the PBGC pension
coverage is lower. Based on these predictions, our identiﬁcation strategy can be divided into two.
We ﬁrst show that airlines are more likely to obtain wage concessions when (1) the airline is
ﬁnancially constrained (measured by either having low cash ﬂow or being in bankruptcy) and (2)
when the pension plan is underfunded. To do so we interact the ﬁnancial position of an airline with
the funding status of the relevant pension plan to determine whether, in ﬁrms in ﬁnancial distress,
employees that are exposed to the risk of losing their pension beneﬁts are more willing to make
concessions. This approach focuses the analysis at the pension plan level while using variation in
ﬁrm ﬁnancial distress and pension plan underfunding. In employing this approach we control for
either ﬁrm or plan ﬁxed eﬀects to identify oﬀ of within airline or within plan variation. We thus
exploit both the cross-sectional variation of plan underfunding within a given ﬁrm as well as the
time-series variation in plan-level underfunding status.
Clearly, both an airline’s ﬁnancial position and pension plan underfunding are endogenous and
likely to be jointly driven by such factors as airline proﬁtability. However, by using an interac-
tion term we can limit the number of alternative explanations that may drive our results. For
example, an airline level ﬁnancial shock cannot on its own explain diﬀerential wage concessions
across diﬀerent employee groups. In contrast, our mechanism is speciﬁcally based on diﬀerent lev-
els of wage concessions across employee groups associated with the degree of underfunding of their
corresponding pension plans.
The next layer of our identiﬁcation strategy exploits the maximum pension guarantee which
is set exogenously by PBGC. While being responsible for paying monthly beneﬁts to retirees of
underfunded terminated pension plans, the PBGC guarantee is limited. The maximum annual
guarantee is a function of age and hence is identical for employees of the same age regardless of
their education, skill or wage.32
32Table B1 reports the maximum annual amounts covered by the PBGC for workers retiring in the years 1992 to
2006 at the age of 50, 55, 60 and 65 years. Throughout our sample, the average maximum guarantee for a retiring
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Figures 1A-C display 25th, 50th and 75th wage percentiles for diﬀerent airline employee groups
relative to the PBGC maximum at diﬀerent retirement ages. Figure 1A displays the data for pilots,
Figure 1B displays the data for ﬂight attendants, while Figure 1C displays the data for mechanics.
Given that the PBGC guarantee is set by law exogenously, we use the diﬀerence between current
wages of diﬀerent airline’s employee groups and the PBGC maximum guarantee to measure the
amount these employees stand to lose if the pension plan is terminated. Clearly, as this diﬀerence
increases, employees stand to lose more from pension plan termination, making their bargaining
position in wage renegotiation weaker. Focusing on the employee groups in Figure 1, pilots exhibit
the largest diﬀerence, followed by mechanics, which are in turn followed by ﬂight attendants. We
can therefore exploit the high dispersion in the diﬀerence between wages and the PBGC limit across
diﬀerent job categories within an airline to identify the bargaining power of the airlines vis-a-vis
diﬀerent employee groups.
As an example, the average wage of a pilot in our sample is about ﬁve times the PBGC limit
for a 60 year old retiree, and the average mechanic wage is more than twice the PBGC limit for
the same age. In contrast, the average wages of ﬂight attendants and traﬃc and handling workers
are higher than the PBGC limit by only 40% and 60%, respectively. Thus, to the extent that their
pension plans are underfunded, pilots and mechanics will be at a weaker bargaining position than
that of other job categories. Our approach is consistent with Brown’s (2008) assertion that “[t]he
maximum insurance beneﬁt is set by law. While more than 90 percent of participants in plans
taken over by the PBGC fall below this beneﬁt limit, in some prominent cases, including those of
some airline pilots, worker lose a substantial fraction of their promised retirement income.”33
Econometrically, we identify the eﬀect of pension underfunding on wage concessions using a
triple-diﬀerence, or DDD, speciﬁcation. These three levels of ?diﬀerences? are: (i) ﬁnancially
distressed vs. non-distressed airlines, (ii) underfunded pension plans vs. funded plans, and (iii)
wages exceeding vs. those that are below the PBGC limit.34 In employing the DDD approach
we also control for either ﬁrm or plan ﬁxed eﬀects to identify oﬀ of within airline or within plan
variation.
60-year-old worker is $24,224 while that for a 65-year-old is $37,268.
33Brown (2008) p. 184.
34This approach is common in applied microeconomics (see for example Gruber, 1994), and has became more
popular recently in corporate ﬁnance applications as well as in Rauh, 2006b.
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VI. Wages, Financial Distress, and Underfunded Pensions
This section presents the results from regression analysis of wage renegotiation. We begin by testing
the relation between ﬁrm ﬁnancial distress, underfunded deﬁned beneﬁts pension plans, and wage
negotiations by estimating diﬀerent variants of the following baseline speciﬁcation:
%∆(wages/employees)a,i,t = β1 × low cash flowa,i,t + β2 × underfundinga,i,t
+ β12 × (low cash flowa,i,t × underfundinga,i,t)
+ baγ + ciδ + dtθ +Xa,tλ+ a,i,t, (1)
where %∆(wages/employees) is the annual percent change in the average wage of an employee
group within an airline for that year. Subscripts indicate airline (a), employee group (i), and year
(t); low cash flow is a dummy variable that equals one if an airline’s earnings plus cash balance
is smaller than its interest expenses and zero otherwise;35 underfunding is a dummy variable that
equals one for underfunded pension plans; ba is a vector of airline ﬁxed-eﬀects; ci is a vector of
employee group ﬁxed-eﬀects; dt is a vector of year ﬁxed-eﬀects; Xa,i,t is a vector of airline controls
that includes size (log book value of assets), leverage, the market-to-book ratio and the wage share
of the employee category group as a fraction of total ﬁrm wage expenses; and a,i,t is the regression
residual.
We report the results from estimating diﬀerent variants of regression (1) in the ﬁrst three
columns of Table 3. Tables throughout the paper report regressions coeﬃcients and standard
errors that are clustered at the airline level. Our main coeﬃcient of interest is β12 – the coeﬃcient
of the interaction term. This coeﬃcient captures the joint eﬀect of airline ﬁnancial distress and the
underfunding of the pension plan of an employee group within an airline on wage concessions made
by members of that employee group.
As the ﬁrst three columns of Table 3 demonstrate, we ﬁnd that β12 is consistently negative and
statistically signiﬁcant – distressed airlines obtain wage concessions from the employee groups whose
pension plans are underfunded.36 Our results hold after controlling for airline speciﬁc controls, year
ﬁxed eﬀects, and both airline and plan ﬁxed eﬀects.37 The estimates of β12 are between -3.7% and
35Our results are not sensitive to this deﬁnition – we obtain similar results if we deﬁne low cash ﬂow as airlines
with non-positive earnings, or as those airlines with proﬁtability rates below the 33rd percentile.
36While the coeﬃcients of both low cash ﬂow and underfunding are negative they are not statistically diﬀerent
from zero.
37Obviously, we cannot control for both airline and plan ﬁxed-eﬀects at the same time as employee groups are
deﬁned at the airline level.
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-4.7%, suggesting that airlines obtain wage concessions that are around four percent of the annual
average wage when both cash ﬂow is low and the employee’s pension plan is underfunded.
We repeat the analysis in regression (1), this time using bankruptcy as a measure of ﬁnancial
distress. To this end, we replace the low cash flow dummy variable with a bankruptcy dummy
variable that takes on the value of one when an airline is in Chapter-11 during a given year.38
The results for the bankruptcy regressions are reported in the last three columns of Table 3.
While we ﬁnd that average wages decline by between 6.9% and 9.8% during bankruptcy years, the
interaction between bankruptcy and underfunding is not statistically signiﬁcant in any of the three
regressions presented in the table. Our results potentially indicate that airlines tend to perform
most labor renegotiations before they ﬁle for Chapter-11. However, we revisit these results in
our DDD speciﬁcations in the next section and ﬁnd evidence that airlines strategically renegotiate
wages in bankruptcy as well.
VII. Wages, Pension Underfunding and the PBGC Maximum Guar-
antee
The results thus far show that wages are more likely to be negotiated downwards during periods
of ﬁnancial distress when deﬁned beneﬁts plans are underfunded. While the evidence is consistent
with a strategic use of pension underfunding, it is also possible that pension underfunding merely
reﬂects deep ﬁnancial distress. According to this alternative view, the speciﬁc mechanism is not the
threat of pension-dumping but rather the overall poor ﬁnancial position of the ﬁrm. Thus, while
our results indicate that two conditions are needed to facilitate wage concessions – both ﬁnancial
distress and pension underfunding – it is also possible to argue that, empirically, the interaction
term is capturing a severe version of ﬁnancial distress and does not necessarily indicate a causal
eﬀect of the threat to dump pensions.
38None of the airlines in the sample ﬁled for Chapter-7. The Chapter-11 bankruptcies in our sample include:
Continental Airlines (1990-1993), Trans World Airways (1992-1993 and 1995), Hawaiian Airlines (1993-1994 and
2003-2005), US Airways (2002-2003 and 2004-2005), United Airlines (2002-2006), Delta Airlines (2005-2007) and
Northwest Airlines (2005-2007).
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A. Diﬀerences-in-Diﬀerences-in-Diﬀerences: Financially Constrained Airlines
To identify the causal eﬀect of pension underfunding, we exploit the variation in the diﬀerence
between airline employee salaries and the PBGC maximum annual guarantee. The strategic use
of pension underfunding in wage renegotiation predicts that the ﬁnding that ﬁnancial distress
and pension underfunding are associated with wage concessions should be concentrated amongst
employee groups whose pensions are not fully covered by the PBGC guarantee. Indeed, since
employees belonging to these groups would stand to lose the most from pension plan termination,
their outside option in wage renegotiation is lower. To test this prediction, we use the following
triple interaction speciﬁcation:
%∆(wages/employees)a,i,t = β1 × low cash flowa,i,t + β2 × underfundinga,i,t + β3 × PBGCa,i,t
+ β12 × (low cash flowa,i,t × underfundinga,i,t)
+ β13 × (low cash flowa,i,t × PBGCa,i,t)
+ β23 × (underfundinga,i,t × PBGCa,i,t)
+ β123 × (low cash flowa,i,t × underfundinga,i,t × PBGCa,i,t)
+ baγ + ciδ + dtθ +Xa,tλ+ a,i,t, (2)
where %∆(wages/employees) is the annual percent change in the average per-employee wage of
one of the employee groups within an airline for that year. Subscripts indicate airline (a), employee
group (i), and year (t); low cash flow is a dummy variable that equals one if airline’s earnings plus
cash balance is smaller than its interest expenses and zero otherwise; underfunding is a dummy
variable that equals one for underfunded pension plans and zero otherwise; PBGC is a dummy
variable that equals to one if the average wage is larger than 1.5 times the PBGC annual maximum
guarantee; ba is a vector of airline ﬁxed-eﬀects; ci is a vector of employee group ﬁxed-eﬀects; dt is
a vector of year ﬁxed-eﬀects; Xa,i,t is a vector of airline controls that includes size (log book value
of assets), leverage ratio, the market-to-book ratio and the wage share of the employee category
group as a fraction of total ﬁrm wage expenses; and a,i,t is the regression residual. The main
coeﬃcient in the DDD speciﬁcation is β123 which identiﬁes the eﬀect of underfunded pension plans,
in ﬁnancially distressed airlines, on the wages of employees that are not fully covered by the PBGC
maximum guarantee.
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As the ﬁrst three columns of Table 4 show, the DDD estimator β123 is negative and statistically
signiﬁcant, ranging from -9.3% to -11.2%. Thus, consistent with strategic wage renegotiation,
airlines in ﬁnancial distress can successfully negotiate down the wages of their employees whose
pensions are underfunded and are not fully covered by the PBGC maximum guarantee. As before,
our results are robust to the inclusion of year and either airline or plan ﬁxed eﬀects in addition
to airline speciﬁc controls. In the last three columns of the table we reﬁne the deﬁnition of the
underfunding dummy to capture higher levels of underfunding. The DDD estimator is -9.2% when
the pension plan is underfunded by at least 10%, while it is -11.4% and -7.6% when the pension
plan is underfunded by at least 15% and 25%, respectively.
We supplement our analysis by regressing the change in average wages (instead of the percentage
change) and report results in Panel A of Table 5. While all the regressions in Table 5 control for
the same explanatory variables as in earlier regressions, we do not report their coeﬃcients for
brevity. The DDD estimator β123 estimates the average amount (in $) that ﬁnancially constrained
airlines extract from employees whose average wage exceeds the PBGC limit when their pension
plans are underfunded. As the ﬁrst three columns of the table show, airlines can strategically use
underfunded pensions to reduce the average wage of relatively highly paid employees who are not
covered by the PBGC by an amount that is between $12,252 and $14,795 per year. Furthermore,
as the ﬁfth and six columns of Table 5 show, an underfunding level of at least 15% or 25% allows
airlines to cut the average wage of highly-paid employees by an annual amount of $16,983 and
$17,360, respectively.
B. Robustness tests
B.1 Controlling for Airline*Year Fixed Eﬀects
Our empirical strategy is to study within ﬁrm wage renegotiation by using intra-airline data on
wages, pension underfunding, and relative PBGC coverage. While our results are robust to the
inclusion of both airline and year ﬁxed eﬀects, it is still possible that the variation in our regres-
sions comes from changes in the degree of airline ﬁnancial distress over time as opposed to pure
within-airline cross-sectional variation in pension funding. We attempt to alleviate this concern by
including airline*year ﬁxed-eﬀects in the regressions. Results are reported in Table 6. The inclu-
sion of airline*year ﬁxed eﬀects allows us to have a cleaner within-airline comparison of diﬀerent
employee groups. As the table shows, the DDD coeﬃcient is negative and is similar to our previous
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results (-0.092 in Table 6 compared to -0.102 in Table 4). Given our sample size (476 plan-year
observations), the inclusion of 137 ﬁxed eﬀects diminishes the statistical signiﬁcance of the results.
Nevertheless, in our main speciﬁcation we ﬁnd that β123 is equal to -0.092 and is statistically sig-
niﬁcant at the 5 percent level. When we consider underfunding of at least 10% we ﬁnd that β123
equals -0.081 and is not statistically signiﬁcant (standard error=0.054), while when underfunding
is deﬁned at the 15% level β123 equals -0.098 and is signiﬁcant at the 6 percent level. Finally, as
before, we do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant results when deep-underfunding is calculated at an underfunding
level of 25%.
B.2 Controlling for Employee Groups Eﬀects and Placebo Analysis
One concern with the DDD identiﬁcation strategy is that the triple interaction estimator is just
picking-up those employee groups that account for a large share of an airline’s wage expense and
hence have larger margins to make concessions. For example, according to this alternate hypothesis,
ﬁrms in ﬁnancial distress can negotiate highly paid pilots’ wages downwards not because of the fact
that their pensions are not covered by the PBGC but simply because pilots have larger slack in
which to make wage concessions.39
This concern is alleviated in three ways. First, throughout the paper and in every regression
we control for the ratio between the wage of an employee group and the overall wage expense of
the airline. For example, we divide the aggregate wages of pilots by the total wage expenses of the
airline. We ﬁnd that the results are always robust to the inclusion of this wage share variable.
Second, we control directly for speciﬁc job group ﬁxed-eﬀects and show that our results are
robust to these eﬀects. As Table 7 shows, after controlling for pilots, ﬂight attendants and me-
chanics ﬁxed eﬀects, in addition to year, airline and plan ﬁxed eﬀects, β123 the DDD coeﬃcient is
statistically signiﬁcant with an economic magnitude that is between 9.7% and 11.2%. Moreover,
in unreported results we also include (job group)*year ﬁxed-eﬀects – on top of year, airline or plan
ﬁxed-eﬀects – and ﬁnd that our results still hold.
The third method we use to alleviate the concern that a speciﬁc job-group – in particular pilots
– is driving our results is a placebo analysis. We note that the alternate hypothesis that highly paid
employees have larger concession margins in renegotiation does not easily explain the impact of
39Note, though, that this alternate theory implicitly requires that the level of pilots’ rents (as deﬁned by the
diﬀerence between pilot wages and their next best outside oﬀer) be higher than that of other employee groups, as
opposed to simply the level of pilot wages being higher than that of other groups.
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pension plan underfunding on the ability of ﬁrms to extract wage concessions. In particular, if the
results are explained by greater slack among highly paid employee groups rather than by strategic
use of pensions in bargaining, pension plan underfunding should not play much of a role. This
reasoning suggests the following placebo analysis to test the importance of underfunded pension
plans in strategic renegotiation.
We collect data on airlines that do not have deﬁned beneﬁts pensions plans – mostly small
regional airlines, with the exception of Southwest and JetBlue.40 For each of these airlines, we
deﬁne within-airline placebo employee groups using the same employee group classiﬁcation used
throughout our analysis above (pilots, mechanic etc.) We next run a set of double interaction
regressions with the annual change in employee-group wages as the dependent variable. As the
independent variables the regressions include the low cash ﬂow dummy variable, the PBGC-based
dummy variable (that takes on a value of one if the average annual wage of a given employee group
is larger than 1.5 times the PBGC annual maximum guarantee), and the interaction between these
two variables. As further controls the regressions include year and either airline or plan ﬁxed eﬀects,
as well as leverage, wage share, and both airline size and size-squared to adjust for a potential non-
linear eﬀect of airline size given that many of the airlines without deﬁned beneﬁts pension plans
are small.41 We run the regressions separately for airlines with pension plans deeply underfunded
at levels greater than 10% or 15% (the treatment group) and airlines with no deﬁned-beneﬁts
plans (placebo). As Table 8 shows, the coeﬃcient of the interactions between the low cash ﬂow
dummy variable and the PBGC dummies are negative (between -0.062 and -0.102) and statistically
signiﬁcant in the speciﬁcations that include both airline and year ﬁxed eﬀects. In contrast, when
we run the regression using the placebo group, the coeﬃcient of the interaction term is positive and
close to zero (either 0.02 or 0.028) and is not statistically signiﬁcant. Had our results been driven by
some employee groups making concessions for reasons that are unrelated to pension underfunding
– for example, highly paid pilots having greater slack to make concessions – the interaction term
should have been negative and signiﬁcant in the placebo regressions as well.
40The minimum size of an airline in the BTS data is $20 million.
41We cannot control for market-to-book given that the vast majority of the smaller airlines are not publicly traded.
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B.3 Controlling for Industry Conditions
As an additional robustness test we control for industry conditions in Table 9 and reestimate
regression (2). We construct three aggregate measures of airline industry condition: (i) weighted-
average market-to-book, (ii) average fuel cost, and (iii) industry average proﬁtability. Appendix A
provides details on the construction of these variables. Since our measures of industry performance
are based on pure time-series variation, we cannot include both year ﬁxed-eﬀects and industry
controls jointly. As Table 9 demonstrates, the inclusion of industry controls (in lieu of year eﬀects)
improves the precision of the DDD estimates, which are now always statistically signiﬁcant at the
1 percent level. The point estimates are similar to those documented earlier – underfunded pension
plans of employee groups that are not fully covered by the PBGC enable distressed airlines to
extract wage concessions that are between 9.7% and 11.4% of the annual average wage.
B.4 Unionization and Negotiations Outcomes
Finally, while we do not control for unionization levels directly, labor unions are important de-
terminants of wage increases and collective bargaining negotiations (Lewis, 1986). While many
of the studies in this ﬁeld utilize cross-industry variation in unionization levels, our focus on one
particular industry alleviates the concern about the diﬀerential eﬀect of unionization rates on wage
negotiations. Indeed, air transportation is among the most unionized industries – according to
Hirsch and Macpherson’s estimates, 45.1% of the employees in the air transportation employees
were unionized in 2008. Moreover, by studying airlines with deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans, we
focus mostly on the most unionized airlines within the airline industry.42 Still, to conﬁrm that
unionization rates are high and persistent in our sample, we gather ﬁrm level information on airline
unionization rates. Since ﬁrm level unionization rates are not widely available, we follow Eschuk
(2001) and read the 10-K ﬁlings of all airlines in our sample.43 Some airlines report the actual
number of their employees that are unionized while others just state whether a large share of their
employees are unionized or not. We report the direct share of the employees that are unionized
whenever this information is available in the airline’s 10-K. Otherwise, we use a dummy variable
that equals one if the airline reports that a large number of its employees are unionized. As Table
B2 in Appendix B demonstrates, most of the airlines in our sample – with the exception of Delta
42For example, JetBlue, the prominent example of a non-unionized airline has no deﬁned beneﬁts pension plan and
hence is not included in our sample.
43Airline 10-Ks are available in Edgar online starting at 1995.
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airlines and Fedex – are highly unionized. Furthermore, the level of unionization is very persistent
and stays almost constant over time, so that by controlling for airline or plan ﬁxed-eﬀects we are
fully absorbing any diﬀerential eﬀect of unionization.
C. Diﬀerences-in-Diﬀerences-in-Diﬀerences: Airlines in Chapter-11
We now turn to analyze the eﬀect of Chapter-11 on wage negotiations using the DDD approach.
We repeat the analysis in regression (2) but replace the Low Cash Flow dummy variable (meant to
capture poor ﬁnancial condition) with a bankruptcy dummy variable, taking the value of one when
an airline is in bankruptcy. Similar to our previous analysis, we estimate diﬀerent speciﬁcations of
the following baseline regression:
%∆(wages/employees)a,i,t = β1 × bankruptcya,i,t + β2 × underfundinga,i,t + β3 × PBGCa,i,t
+ β12 × (bankruptcya,i,t × underfundinga,i,t)
+ β13 × (bankruptcya,i,t × PBGCa,i,t)
+ β23 × (underfundinga,i,t × PBGCa,i,t)
+ β123 × (bankruptcya,i,t × underfundinga,i,t × PBGCa,i,t)
+ baγ + ciδ + dtθ +Xa,tλ + a,i,t, (3)
As before, we are interested in the DDD coeﬃcient β123 which measures the joint eﬀect of bankruptcy
and underfunding on the wages of employees that are not fully covered by the PBGC maximum
guarantee. We report the results from estimating regression (3) in Table 10. We ﬁnd that β123 is
negative and between -9.5% and -16.4% in all speciﬁcations. When we control for both year and air-
line ﬁxed eﬀects, the DDD coeﬃcient is -12.8% and is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
Further, we ﬁnd that high levels of underfunding lead to deeper wage concessions in bankruptcy:
underfunding of at least 15% of the plan level is associated with average wages that are 16.4%
lower, while underfunding of at least 25% leads to a 14.8% decline in annual average wage. We also
use the change in average wages (in $) instead of the percentage change as a dependent variable
and report the results in Panel B of Table 5. The average amount (in $) that bankrupt airlines
extract from employees whose average wage exceeds the PBGC limit when their pension plans are
underfunded is between $12,778 and $22,621 per year.
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VIII. Conclusion
We analyze the ability of airlines to renegotiate wages, using their ﬁnancial position to extract
concessions from labor. Our empirical results indicate that airlines in poor ﬁnancial position are
able to renegotiate and reduce labor costs of those employees whose pension plans are underfunded.
Furthermore, exploiting the exogenously given PBGC maximum guarantee, we show that airlines
extract larger concessions from employees with average salaries higher than the PBGC limit. Our
evidence supports the view that ﬁrms take advantage of their ﬁnancial position when negotiating
with labor and strategically use the threat of ‘pension dumping’ to extract concessions from labor.
As such, our paper should be viewed as part of a growing literature on the interplay between
ﬁnance and labor market conditions. Recent events in the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–2009, and the
ongoing disruptions in the labor market, underscore the importance of a deeper understanding of
such ﬁrm-labor interactions.
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Appendix A: Variable description and construction
For reference, the following is a list of variables used in the paper, their sources, and a brief de-
scription of how each variable is constructed.
1. Assets (Size): The ﬁrm’s total assets [BTS Schedule B-1 data item 18990] in $million. (Source:
Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Form 41 Financial Data).
2. Bankruptcy dummy: Takes a value of 1 if the ﬁrm is bankrupt during a particular year, and
0 otherwise.
3. Earnings : The ﬁrm’s income before discontinued operations and extraordinary items [BTS
Schedule P-12 data item 91990] + depreciation and amortization [BTS Schedule P-12 data
item 70000]. (Source: Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Form 41 Financial Data).
4. High wage dummy (Wage>1.5*PBGC): Takes a value of 1 if the wage per employee of the
particular job group being analyzed is larger than 1.5 times the maximum PBGC guarantee
for that particular year, and 0 otherwise.
5. Industry average fuel cost (industry control): The average total fuel cost per gallon for the
entire airlines industry in a year, denominated in $dollars. (Source: Bureau of Transportation
Statistics, Airline Fuel Cost and Consumption - U.S. Carriers - Scheduled).
6. Industry market-to-book (industry control): Weighted average (by ﬁrm’s assets) of the market-
to-book ratios for the 12 ﬁrms for which we have available information. (Source: Compustat).
7. Industry profitability (industry control): Average proﬁtability of the airline industry, deﬁned
as the aggregate earnings of all airlines [BTS Schedule B-1 data item 18990] over total ag-
gregate assets of all airlines [BTS Schedule B-1 data item 18990]. (Source: Bureau of Trans-
portation Statistics, Form 41 Financial Data).
8. Job groups or categories : The BTS Form 41 Schedule P-10 groups workers in 15 diﬀerent cat-
egories, while the wage information we have gathered classiﬁes them into six categories. The
BTS’s employment categories descriptions are used to match the 15 employee categories with
the six wage categories. This grouping is as follows: 1) Pilots (Pilots & Co-pilots + Other
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Flight Personnel); 2) Flight Attendants (Passenger/General Services & Administration); 3)
Mechanics & Maintenance (Maintenance); 4) Traﬃc and Handling (Aircraft & Traﬃc Han-
dling Group 1 + General Aircraft & Traﬃc Handling + Aircraft Control + Passenger Handling
+ Cargo Handling); 5) General Management (General Manager); and, 6) Other (Trainees &
Instructor + Statistical + Traﬃc Solicitors + Other + Transport Related).
9. Leverage: The ﬁrm’s total current liabilities [BTS Schedule B-1 data item 21990] + long-term
debt [BTS Schedule B-1 data item 22100] all over total assets [BTS Schedule B-1 data item
18990]. (Source: Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Form 41 Financial Data).
10. Low cash flow dummy : Takes a value of one if the ﬁrm’s earnings + cash balances [BTS
Schedule B-1 data item 10100] are smaller than its interest expenses (which are deﬁned as the
interest on long-term debt and capital leases [BTS Schedule P-12 data item 81810] + other
interests [BTS Schedule P-12 data item 81820]), and zero otherwise.
11. Market-to-book : The ﬁrm’s market value of equity [Compustat Annual Items 24*25] + book
value of assets [Compustat Annual Item 6] minus the book value of equity [Compustat Annual
Item 60] all over book value of assets [Compustat Annual Item 6]. (Source: Compustat).
12. Maximum guarantee (by PBGC): The maximum yearly amount the Pension Beneﬁt Guaranty
Corporation insures in case of a deﬁned beneﬁt pension plan termination. This amount
depends both on the age of the worker at the time of retirement and on the calendar year
in which the worker retires. If a worker’s vested pension beneﬁts are lower than the PBGC
maximum guarantee, the worker receives no more than the maximum guarantee upon pension
plan termination. (Source: Pension Beneﬁt Guaranty Corporation).
13. Profitability : Earnings over total assets [BTS Schedule B-1 data item 18990]. (Source: Bureau
of Transportation Statistics, Form 41 Financial Data).
14. Relative (%) change in wages per employee: The wages per employee at time (t) minus wages
per employee at time (t-1) all over wages per employee at time (t-1).
15. Underfunding : The current liability of total beneﬁts (for all participants) [IRS Form 5500
Schedule B] - (plan) total assets [IRS Form 5500 Schedule H]. Note that this is positive when
there is plan underfunding and negative when there is overfunding. For years 1992 to 1994
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the OBRA87 current liability is used, while for 1995 to 2006 the RPA94 current liability is
employed. (IRS Form 5500).
16. Underfunding Dummies : Take on a value of one if underfunding is larger than a certain
percentage of plan total assets, and zero otherwise. The benchmark is underfunding larger
than zero, but diﬀerent thresholds are used to analyze deep underfunding. In particular, we
deﬁne dummies for underfunding>10% of plan total assets, underfunding>15% of plan total
assets, and for underfunding>25% of plan total assets.
17. Wages per employee: The total amount of wages given to an employee group in a year over
the total number of employees in that group that year. The variable used in the regressions
refers to the wages per employee of the particular job category (or categories) that matches
the employee group covered by a certain deﬁned beneﬁt pension plan. A detailed description
of how this variable is constructed is oﬀered in the Sample Construction section. (Source:
Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Form 41 Financial Data).
18. Wage share: The ratio of the wage of an employee group to the overall wage expense of the
airline.
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Appendix B: Appendix Tables
Table B1
Maximum Annual Guarantees Given by PBGC
This table provides the maximum annual amount covered by the Pension Beneﬁt Guaranty Corporation at diﬀerent ages at
the time of retirement.
50 Years 55 Years 60 Years 65 Years
1992 $9,879 $12,702 $18,348 $28,227
1993 $10,238 $13,163 $19,013 $29,250
1994 $10,739 $13,807 $19,943 $30,682
1995 $10,810 $13,899 $20,076 $30,886
1996 $11,097 $14,267 $20,608 $31,705
1997 $11,598 $14,911 $21,539 $33,136
1998 $12,099 $15,556 $22,469 $34,568
1999 $12,815 $16,476 $23,769 $36,614
2000 $13,531 $17,397 $25,128 $38,659
2001 $14,247 $18,317 $26,458 $40,705
2002 $15,034 $19,330 $27,921 $42,955
2003 $15,392 $19,790 $28,585 $43,977
2004 $15,535 $19,974 $28,851 $44,386
2005 $15,965 $20,526 $29,649 $45,614
2006 $16,681 $21,447 $30,978 $47,659
Mean $13,044 $16,771 $24,224 $37,268
Table B2
Labor Unionization
This table provides the percentage of labor that is unionized in each ﬁrm. For those ﬁrm-year observations in which there
is no detailed information, a dummy variable is used which takes a value of one if the ﬁrm has three or more unions and
zero otherwise.
Airline 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Alaska Airlines 1 1 87% 88% 87% 86% 84% 84% 1 84% 83%
American Airlines 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Continental Airlines 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 44% 1 42% 1
Delta Airlines 0 0 0 0 14% 16% 0 18% 18% 18% 18%
Federal Express 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hawaiian Airlines 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 85%
Midwest Express 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 33% 1 35%
Northwest Airlines 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Trans World Airlines 1 1 1 1 1 1 - - - - -
United Airlines 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 78% 80%
United Parcel Services 1 1 1 1 1 60% 60% 64% 1 64% 1
US Airways 69% 68% 65% 84% 84% 85% 86% 83% 84% 84% 81%
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Figure 1A. Pilot Wage Quartiles and the PBGC Max Guarantee
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
160,000
180,000
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Wage 25th Wage Median Wage 75th PBGC 50Y
PBGC 60Y PBGC 65Y
Figure 1B. Flight Attendant Wage Quartiles and the PBGC Max Guarantee
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Figure 1C. Mechanics Wage Quartiles and the PBGC Max Guarantee
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Table 1:
The Delta Airlines Case Study: Initial Situation and Negotiation Outcomes
for Pilots and for Non-Pilots
This table provides descriptive statistics on wages and pensions of pilots and non-pilots before and after Delta’s bankruptcy
(September 15, 2005). Before Bankruptcy: negotiations during 2003, 2004, and 2005 prior to bankruptcy. After Bankruptcy:
negotiations during 2005 post bankruptcy and in 2006.
Panel A: Wage and Pension Plan Situation
Pilots Non-Pilots
2004 2005 2006 2004 2005 2006
Number of employees 6,786 6,181 5,706 50,772 46,050 39,856
Wages
- Total Wages ($m) $1,421 $961 $726 $2,525 $2,040 $1,705
- Average Wage ($) $209,330 $155,532 $127,268 $49,735 $44,297 $42,778
- PBGC Maximum Guarantee ($) $44,386 $45,614 $47,659 $44,386 $45,614 $47,659
- Wages share of job group 36.0% 32.0% 29.9% 64.0% 68.0% 70.1%
Plan underfunding
- Underfunding ($m) $1,194 $1,858 $2,172 $2,124 $2,728 $2,965
- Underfunding per employee ($) $175,957 $300,530 $380,687 $41,834 $59,239 $74,393
- Underfunding as % of plan assets 40.8% 86.0% 124.6% 47.5% 59.2% 64.6%
- Funding ratio (Assets/Liabilities) 71.0% 53.8% 44.5% 67.8% 62.8% 60.8%
Panel B: Negotiation Outcomes
Pilots Non-Pilots
Before bankruptcy (Jan/03 - Sep/05)
- Average wage cut 32.5% 10.0%
- Pension plan status Frozen As usual (no change)
After bankruptcy (Sep/05 - Dec/06)
- Average wage cut 14.0% 7.5%
- Pension plan status Terminated Frozen
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Table 2:
Summary Statistics
This table provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis.
Panel A: Wage and Benefit Variables
25th 75th Standard
Mean Percentile Median Percentile Deviation Min Max
Total number of employees 45,663 9,523 39,952 72,480 35,446 1,856 126,634
(wages/operating revenue) 24.1% 21.2% 24.9% 27.5% 5.4% 11.6% 36.8%
Wage Share (of job group) 39.0% 18.3% 29.8% 47.0% 27.1% 1.9% 100.0%
(wages/employees)
- Total $70,143 $36,864 $50,400 $106,634 $43,235 $12,877 $209,330
- Pilots $125,203 $111,462 $128,100 $139,863 $27,529 $65,143 $209,330
- Flight Attendants $34,210 $29,834 $34,184 $38,049 $6,629 $19,519 $49,576
- Mechanics and Maintenance $58,731 $38,788 $50,152 $68,849 $28,476 $27,275 $173,504
- Traﬃc and Handling $38,624 $31,560 $37,505 $42,277 $11,343 $24,130 $116,074
% change (wages/employees)
- Total 3.8% -2.2% 3.8% 8.8% 12.6% -37.1% 67.3%
- Pilots 3.0% -3.7% 3.4% 8.2% 11.3% -37.1% 34.0%
- Flight Attendants 4.0% -2.0% 2.5% 9.1% 13.0% -30.7% 65.0%
- Mechanics and Maintenance 5.1% -4.0% 3.3% 11.6% 18.8% -53.6% 68.1%
- Traﬃc and Handling 1.3% -4.8% 1.9% 6.7% 12.3% -41.0% 59.0%
Panel B: Other Variables
25th 75th Standard
Mean Percentile Median Percentile Deviation Min Max
Underfunding dummy 0.557 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.497 0.0 1.0
Underfunding>10% of plan assets 0.389 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.488 0.0 1.0
Underfunding>15% of plan assets 0.340 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.474 0.0 1.0
Underfunding>20% of plan assets 0.271 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.445 0.0 1.0
Underfunding>25% of plan assets 0.221 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.415 0.0 1.0
Size ($m) $10,792 $4,189 $8,725 $17,815 $7,979 $160 $28,177
Market-to-Book 1.252 1.020 1.136 1.251 0.479 0.743 4.084
Leverage 0.562 0.468 0.587 0.656 0.163 0.025 0.983
Proﬁtability 3.67% -0.61% 5.24% 9.53% 8.35% -24.64% 26.14%
Low Cash Flow dummy 0.296 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.457 0.0 1.0
Bankruptcy dummy 0.155 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.363 0.0 1.0
(Wage>PBGC) dummy 0.815 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.389 0.0 1.0
(Wage>1.5*PBGC) dummy 0.435 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.496 0.0 1.0
(Wage>2*PBGC) dummy 0.338 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.474 0.0 1.0
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Table 3:
Wages and Underfunding
The dependent variable in all regressions is the percentage change in (Wages/Employees). All regressions include an
intercept (not reported). The regressions control for size, leverage, market-to-book, wage share, low cash ﬂow dummy,
underfunding dummy (an indicator variable that equals one if underfunding is larger than zero), and bankruptcy
dummy. Bankruptcy regressions also control for proﬁtability (return on assets). The regressions also include either an
interaction term between the low cash ﬂow and underfunding dummies or an interaction term between the bankruptcy
and underfunding dummies. All regressions include year- and either airline or plan ﬁxed-eﬀects. Standard errors are
calculated by clustering at the airline level.
Dependent % change in % change in % change in % change in % change in % change in
Variable= wages/ wages/ wages/ wages/ wages/ wages/
employees employees employees employees employees employees
Ln(Assets) -0.001 0.081 a 0.070 a 0.000 0.054 b 0.050 b
(0.004) (0.021) (0.022) (0.004) (0.023) (0.022)
Leverage 0.031 0.209 b 0.198 b 0.085 0.104 0.106
(0.071) (0.085) (0.085) (0.072) (0.077) (0.076)
Market-to-Book 0.006 -0.010 -0.019 0.022 0.039 0.030
(0.013) (0.027) (0.024) (0.015) (0.027) (0.029)
Wage Share -0.021 -0.028 1.428 a -0.029 c -0.038 c 1.364 a
(0.017) (0.023) (0.357) (0.014) (0.020) (0.431)
Proﬁtability 0.154 0.218 c 0.188
(0.110) (0.113) (0.114)
Low Cash Flow -0.014 -0.016 -0.020
(0.021) (0.023) (0.022)
Underfunding 0.000 -0.009 -0.002 -0.006 -0.028 b -0.019
(0.010) (0.011) (0.017) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016)
Low Cash Flow -0.045 b -0.047 a -0.037 b
×Underfunding (0.016) (0.012) (0.015)
Bankruptcy -0.069 a -0.098 b -0.097 b
(0.019) (0.032) (0.036)
Bankruptcy -0.036 0.004 0.016
×Underfunding (0.029) (0.031) (0.036)
Adjusted R2 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.14
Fixed-Eﬀects
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Airline No Yes No No Yes No
Plan No No Yes No No Yes
# of airlines 12 12 12 12 12 12
# of plans 46 46 46 46 46 46
Observations 476 476 476 470 470 470
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Table 4:
Wages Underfunding and PBGC Coverage
The dependent variable in all regressions is the percentage change in (Wages/Employees). All regressions include an
intercept (not reported). The regressions control for size, leverage, market-to-book, wage share, low cash ﬂow dummy,
underfunding dummy (an indicator variable that equals one if underfunding is larger than zero (ﬁrst 3 columns), 10%
(column 4), 15% (column 5), and 25% (column 6)), and Wage>PBGC dummy (an indicator variables that takes the
value of one if wage is larger than 1.5×PBGC maximum guarantee.) The regressions also include interaction terms
between the low cash ﬂow, underfunding, and the Wage>PBGC dummies and a triple interaction term as well. All
regressions include year- and either airline or plan ﬁxed-eﬀects. Standard errors are calculated by clustering at the
airline level.
underfunding>
10% 15% 25%
Dependent % change in % change in % change in % change in % change in % change in
Variable= wages/ wages/ wages/ wages/ wages/ wages/
employees employees employees employees employees employees
Ln(Assets) 0.000 0.086 a 0.061 b 0.062 b 0.064 b 0.060 c
(0.005) (0.021) (0.024) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028)
Leverage 0.043 0.216 b 0.200 b 0.200 b 0.202 b 0.206 a
(0.076) (0.084) (0.082) (0.075) (0.072) (0.067)
Market-to-Book 0.004 -0.009 -0.014 -0.011 -0.008 -0.003
(0.013) (0.027) (0.027) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023)
Wage Share -0.008 -0.012 1.106 a 1.152 a 1.143 a 1.169 a
(0.021) (0.028) (0.322) (0.322) (0.330) (0.341)
Low Cash Flow -0.032 -0.035 -0.034 -0.034 -0.037 -0.019
(0.026) (0.026) (0.022) (0.026) (0.030) (0.026)
Underfunding -0.013 -0.028 -0.029 -0.006 -0.001 -0.017
(0.018) (0.022) (0.024) (0.021) (0.026) (0.020)
Wage>PBGC 0.009 0.009 0.120 a 0.129 a 0.131 a 0.137 a
(0.017) (0.012) (0.034) (0.039) (0.041) (0.042)
Low Cash Flow -0.008 -0.003 0.010 0.012 0.018 -0.021
×Underfunding (0.021) (0.017) (0.020) (0.026) (0.032) (0.026)
(Wage>PBGC) 0.036 0.049 0.042 0.029 0.025 0.026
×Underfunding (0.025) (0.028) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025) (0.031)
Low Cash Flow 0.052 0.053 0.056 c 0.029 0.037 0.006
×(Wage>PBGC) (0.030) (0.032) (0.031) (0.034) (0.034) (0.040)
Low Cash Flow -0.093 b -0.102 a -0.112 a -0.092 c -0.114 b -0.076 b
×Underfunding (0.030) (0.025) (0.024) (0.048) (0.041) (0.034)
×(Wage>PBGC)
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.12 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17
Fixed-Eﬀects
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Airline No Yes No No No No
Plan No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of airlines 12 12 12 12 12 12
# of plans 46 46 46 46 46 46
Observations 476 476 476 476 476 476
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Table 5:
Actual Wage Concessions ($ Change)
The dependent variable in all regressions is the dollar change in (Wages/Employees). All regressions include an
intercept (not reported) and the standard set of control variables. Standard errors are calculated by clustering at the
airline level.
Panel A: Wages Underfunding and PBGC Coverage ($ Change)
undefunding>
10% 15% 25%
Dependent $ change in $ change in $ change in $ change in $ change in $ change in
Variable= wages/ wages/ wages/ wages/ wages/ wages/
employees employees employees employees employees employees
Low Cash Flow -$12,252 a -$12,975 a -$14,795 a -$13,039 a -$16,983 b -$17,360 b
×Underfunding ($2,874) ($2,847) ($3,100) ($3,872) ($6,143) ($7,078)
×(Wage>PBGC)
Adjusted R2 0.14 0.16 0.19 0.18 0.20 0.21
# of airlines 12 12 12 12 12 12
# of plans 46 46 46 46 46 46
Observations 476 476 476 476 476 476
Panel B: Wages, Underfunding, Bankruptcy and PBGC Coverage ($ Change)
underfunding>
10% 15% 25%
Dependent $ change in $ change in $ change in $ change in $ change in $ change in
Variable= wages/ wages/ wages/ wages/ wages/ wages/
employees employees employees employees employees employees
Bankruptcy -$12,778 -$14,372 c -$13,549 -$13,028 c -$22,621 c -$22,552
×Underfunding ($7,395) ($7,073) ($7,707) ($7,246) ($11,461) ($13,011)
×(Wage>PBGC)
Adjusted R2 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.24 0.24
# of airlines 12 12 12 12 12 12
# of plans 46 46 46 46 46 46
Observations 470 470 470 470 470 470
Fixed-Eﬀects
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Airline No Yes No No No No
Plan No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 6:
Wages, Underfunding and PBGC Coverage
(controlling for airline-year ﬁxed eﬀects)
The dependent variable in all regressions is the percentage change in (Wages/Employees). All regressions include
an intercept (not reported) and year*airline ﬁxed-eﬀects.. Airline-level controls (size, leverage, market-to-book, low
cash ﬂow dummy) are fully absorbed by airline*year ﬁxed-eﬀects. Regressions control for underfunding dummy (an
indicator variable that equals one if underfunding is larger than zero (column 1), 10% (column 2), 15% (column 3),
and 25% (column 4)), and Wage>PBGC dummy (an indicator variables that takes the value of one if wage is larger
than 1.5×PBGC maximum guarantee.) The regressions also include interaction terms between the low cash ﬂow,
underfunding, and the Wage>PBGC dummies and a triple interaction term as well. Standard errors are calculated
by clustering at the airline level.
underfunding>
10% 15% 25%
Dependent % change in % change in % change in % change in
Variable= wages/ wages/ wages/ wages/
employees employees employees employees
Wages Share -0.008 0.000 0.002 0.003
(0.025) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021)
Underfunding -0.045 -0.049 -0.038 -0.044 b
(0.028) (0.033) (0.031) (0.015)
Wage>PBGC -0.002 0.013 0.018 0.020
(0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014)
Low Cash Flow 0.035 0.041 0.058 0.057
×Underfunding (0.024) (0.043) (0.050) (0.034)
(Wage>PBGC) 0.052 0.038 0.030 0.036
×Underfunding (0.034) (0.039) (0.031) (0.044)
Low Cash Flow 0.044 0.027 0.036 0.002
×(Wage>PBGC) (0.031) (0.030) (0.035) (0.036)
Low Cash Flow -0.092 b -0.081 -0.098 c -0.047
×Underfunding (0.039) (0.054) (0.047) (0.057)
×(Wage>PBGC)
Adjusted R2 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.21
Fixed-Eﬀects
Airline*Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of airlines 12 12 12 12
# of airline*year 137 137 137 137
# of plans 46 46 46 46
Observations 476 476 476 476
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Table 7:
Wages Underfunding and PBGC Coverage (controlling for
job group ﬁxed eﬀects for: pilots, ﬂight attendants and mechanics)
The dependent variable in all regressions is the percentage change in (Wages/Employees). All regressions include an
intercept (not reported). The regressions control for size, leverage, market-to-book, wage share, low cash ﬂow dummy,
underfunding dummy (an indicator variable that equals one if underfunding is larger than zero (ﬁrst 3 columns), 10%
(column 4), 15% (column 5), and 25% (column 6)), and Wage>PBGC dummy (an indicator variables that takes the
value of one if wage is larger than 1.5×PBGC maximum guarantee.) The regressions also include interaction terms
between the low cash ﬂow, underfunding, and the Wage>PBGC dummies and a triple interaction term as well. All
regressions include job group ﬁxed-eﬀects for pilots, ﬂight attendants and mechanics. All regressions include year-
and either airline or plan ﬁxed-eﬀects. Standard errors are calculated by clustering at the airline level.
underfunding>
10% 15% 25%
Dependent % change in % change in % change in % change in % change in % change in
Variable= wages/ wages/ wages/ wages/ wages/ wages/
employees employees employees employees employees employees
Ln(Assets) -0.003 0.076 a 0.061 b 0.062 b 0.064 b 0.060 c
(0.004) (0.019) (0.024) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028)
Leverage 0.072 0.213 b 0.200 b 0.200 b 0.202 b 0.206 a
(0.071) (0.082) (0.082) (0.075) (0.072) (0.067)
Market-to-Book -0.018 -0.008 -0.014 -0.011 -0.008 -0.003
(0.013) (0.027) (0.027) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023)
Wage Share 0.028 0.035 1.106 a 1.152 a 1.143 a 1.169 a
(0.017) (0.028) (0.322) (0.322) (0.330) (0.341)
Pilot Plan -0.083 a -0.077 b 0.563 c 0.595 c 0.605 c 0.611 c
(0.025) (0.027) (0.306) (0.299) (0.305) (0.306)
Flight Att. Plan 0.027 b 0.035 a 1.031 b 1.072 b 1.071 b 1.110 b
(0.010) (0.007) (0.361) (0.356) (0.365) (0.369)
Mechanics Plan 0.052 b 0.059 a 0.932 b 0.959 b 0.955 b 1.002 b
(0.019) (0.015) (0.358) (0.348) (0.360) (0.363)
Low Cash Flow -0.044 c -0.041 -0.034 -0.034 -0.037 -0.019
(0.024) (0.026) (0.022) (0.026) (0.030) (0.026)
Underfunding -0.017 -0.026 -0.029 -0.006 -0.001 -0.017
(0.017) (0.018) (0.024) (0.021) (0.026) (0.020)
Wage>PBGC 0.078 a 0.080 a 0.120 a 0.129 a 0.131 a 0.137 a
(0.022) (0.019) (0.034) (0.039) (0.041) (0.042)
Low Cash Flow 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.012 0.018 -0.021
×Underfunding (0.022) (0.019) (0.020) (0.026) (0.032) (0.026)
(Wage>PBGC) 0.041 0.046 c 0.042 0.029 0.025 0.026
×Underfunding (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025) (0.031)
Low Cash Flow 0.066 b 0.064 c 0.056 c 0.029 0.037 0.006
×(Wage>PBGC) (0.024) (0.031) (0.031) (0.034) (0.034) (0.040)
Low Cash Flow -0.097 a -0.106 a -0.112 a -0.092 c -0.114 b -0.076 b
×Underfunding (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.048) (0.041) (0.034)
×(Wage>PBGC)
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17
Fixed-Eﬀects
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Airline No Yes No No No No
Plan No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of airlines 12 12 12 12 12 12
# of plans 46 46 46 46 46 46
Observations 476 476 476 476 476 476
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Table 8:
Cash Flow and High Wages: Placebo Test
The dependent variable in all regressions is the percentage change in (Wages/Employees). All regressions include an
intercept (not reported). The regressions control for size and size squared, leverage, wage share, low cash ﬂow dummy,
and Wage>PBGC dummy (an indicator variables that takes the value of one if wage is larger than 1.5×PBGC max-
imum guarantee.) The regressions also include an interaction term between the low cash ﬂow and the Wage>PBGC
dummies. All regressions include year- and either airline or plan ﬁxed-eﬀects. Columns 1 and 2 consider only airlines
with deﬁned beneﬁts plans that are underfunded by at least 10%. Columns 3 and 4 consider only airlines with deﬁned
beneﬁts plans that are underfunded by at least 15%. Columns 5 and 6 consider airlines without deﬁned beneﬁts plans.
Standard errors are calculated by clustering at the airline level.
DB airlines DB airlines Non-DB Plan airlines
Underfunding>10% Underfunding>15%
Dependent % change in % change in % change in % change in % change in % change in
Variable= wages/ wages/ wages/ wages/ wages/ wages/
employees employees employees employees employees employees
Ln(Assets) -0.306 -0.542 -0.405 -0.366 -0.014 -0.012
(0.378) (0.367) (0.364) (0.334) (0.055) (0.059)
Ln(Assets) Squared 0.024 0.039 c 0.029 0.028 0.001 0.002
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.005) (0.006)
Leverage 0.175 0.101 0.219 0.179 0.024 0.032
(0.180) (0.205) (0.214) (0.212) (0.050) (0.050)
Wage Share -0.028 1.487 b -0.025 1.518 c 0.152 b 0.534 a
(0.053) (0.571) (0.063) (0.705) (0.065) (0.117)
Low Cash Flow -0.040 -0.032 -0.029 -0.048 0.022 0.024
(0.028) (0.041) (0.025) (0.038) (0.046) (0.049)
Wage>PBGC 0.082 a 0.226 c 0.095 a 0.222 b 0.194 a 0.289 a
(0.021) (0.122) (0.024) (0.077) (0.049) (0.051)
Low Cash Flow -0.071 c -0.079 -0.102 a -0.062 0.028 0.002
×(Wage>PBGC) (0.033) (0.053) (0.029) (0.047) (0.073) (0.076)
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.11 0.06 0.12 0.08 0.07
Fixed-Eﬀects
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Airline Yes No Yes No Yes No
Plan No Yes No Yes No Yes
# of airlines 12 12 12 12 50 50
# of job groups 33 33 33 33 100 100
Observations 183 183 159 159 666 666
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Table 9:
Wages Underfunding and PBGC Coverage (Including Industry Controls)
The dependent variable in all regressions is the percentage change in (Wages/Employees). All regressions include an
intercept (not reported). The regressions control for size, leverage, market-to-book, wage share, low cash ﬂow dummy,
underfunding dummy (an indicator variable that equals one if underfunding is larger than zero), and Wage>PBGC
dummy (an indicator variables that takes the value of one if wage is larger than 1.5×PBGC maximum guarantee.) The
regressions also include interaction terms between the low cash ﬂow, underfunding, and the Wage>PBGC dummies
and a triple interaction term as well. Regressions include time-varying industry conditions (industry control) and
either airline or plan ﬁxed-eﬀects. Standard errors are calculated by clustering at the airline level.
Industry Control
M-to-B (12 airlines) Avg. Fuel Cost Profitability
Dependent % change in % change in % change in % change in % change in % change in
Variable= wages/ wages/ wages/ wages/ wages/ wages/
employees employees employees employees employees employees
Ln(Assets) 0.038 0.025 0.023 0.011 -0.003 -0.012
(0.031) (0.029) (0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.019)
Leverage 0.205 a 0.200 a 0.205 b 0.199 a 0.181 b 0.173 b
(0.057) (0.048) (0.070) (0.060) (0.077) (0.066)
Market-to-Book -0.029 -0.033 -0.038 -0.044 c -0.061 b -0.064 b
(0.032) (0.025) (0.027) (0.023) (0.026) (0.021)
Wage Share -0.007 1.129 a -0.008 1.074 a -0.009 1.068 a
(0.027) (0.303) (0.027) (0.291) (0.024) (0.287)
Industry Control -0.148 c -0.135 c -0.051 -0.043 0.104 0.009
(0.068) (0.063) (0.030) (0.028) (0.182) (0.173)
Low Cash Flow -0.045 b -0.042 b -0.029 -0.026 -0.026 -0.026
(0.018) (0.017) (0.024) (0.021) (0.032) (0.029)
Underfunding -0.027 c -0.025 -0.028 -0.027 -0.033 b -0.036 c
(0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.015) (0.018)
Wage>PBGC 0.009 0.122 a 0.007 0.124 a 0.005 0.123 a
(0.014) (0.033) (0.013) (0.034) (0.014) (0.031)
Low Cash Flow -0.004 0.010 -0.018 -0.004 -0.016 -0.002
×Underfunding (0.014) (0.016) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020)
(Wage>PBGC) 0.046 0.040 c 0.050 c 0.045 c 0.053 b 0.050 b
×Underfunding (0.026) (0.021) (0.027) (0.021) (0.024) (0.020)
Low Cash Flow 0.058 c 0.063 c 0.051 c 0.056 0.055 c 0.060 c
×(Wage>PBGC) (0.031) (0.034) (0.028) (0.032) (0.028) (0.031)
Low Cash Flow -0.100 a -0.114 a -0.097 a -0.111 a -0.104 a -0.118 a
×Underfunding (0.019) (0.021) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.021)
×(Wage>PBGC)
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.15 0.08 0.14 0.07 0.13
Fixed-Eﬀects
Year No No No No No No
Airline Yes No Yes No Yes No
Plan No Yes No Yes No Yes
# of airlines 12 12 12 12 12 12
# of plans 46 46 46 46 46 46
Observations 476 476 476 476 476 476
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Table 10:
Wages, Underfunding, Bankruptcy and PBGC Coverage
The dependent variable in all regressions is the percentage change in (Wages/Employees). All regressions include
an intercept (not reported). The regressions control for size, leverage, market-to-book , wage share, proﬁtability,
bankruptcy dummy, underfunding dummy (an indicator variable that equals one if underfunding is larger than zero
(columns 1-3), 10% (column 4), 15% (column 5), and 25% (column 6)), and Wage>PBGC dummy (an indicator vari-
ables that takes the value of one if wage is larger than 1.5×PBGC maximum guarantee.) The regressions also include
interaction terms between the bankruptcy, underfunding, and the Wage>PBGC dummies and a triple interaction
term as well. All regressions include year- and either airline or plan ﬁxed-eﬀects. Standard errors are calculated by
clustering at the airline level.
underfunding>
10% 15% 25%
Dependent % change in % change in % change in % change in % change in % change in
Variable= wages/ wages/ wages/ wages/ wages/ wages/
employees employees employees employees employees employees
Ln(Assets) 0.000 0.058 b 0.045 c 0.045 c 0.039 c 0.043
(0.005) (0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.024)
Leverage 0.097 0.109 0.123 0.130 0.118 0.123
(0.076) (0.075) (0.078) (0.074) (0.070) (0.071)
Market-to-Book 0.018 0.043 0.031 0.027 0.026 0.028
(0.015) (0.027) (0.031) (0.029) (0.029) (0.027)
Wage Share -0.017 -0.022 1.064 b 1.096 b 1.076 a 1.074 a
(0.017) (0.023) (0.384) (0.370) (0.341) (0.341)
Proﬁtability 0.164 0.213 c 0.185 0.162 0.143 0.152
(0.108) (0.111) (0.110) (0.117) (0.100) (0.099)
Bankruptcy -0.088 a -0.138 a -0.113 b -0.113 b -0.093 c -0.082
(0.009) (0.027) (0.045) (0.037) (0.044) (0.053)
Underfunding -0.014 -0.045 c -0.041 -0.019 -0.006 -0.030 c
(0.020) (0.025) (0.025) (0.016) (0.024) (0.014)
Wage>PBGC 0.015 0.013 0.123 a 0.131 a 0.132 a 0.134 b
(0.014) (0.014) (0.037) (0.038) (0.042) (0.045)
Bankruptcy 0.003 0.068 b 0.060 0.071 a 0.044 0.044
×Underfunding (0.031) (0.031) (0.043) (0.022) (0.027) (0.044)
(Wage>PBGC) 0.023 0.040 0.032 0.020 0.016 0.034
×Underfunding (0.027) (0.033) (0.033) (0.027) (0.022) (0.033)
Bankruptcy 0.048 0.075 c 0.069 b 0.048 0.082 b 0.056 b
×(Wage>PBGC) (0.032) (0.035) (0.028) (0.027) (0.031) (0.023)
Bankruptcy -0.095 -0.128 b -0.115 c -0.100 c -0.164 b -0.148 c
×Underfunding (0.058) (0.054) (0.063) (0.051) (0.059) (0.068)
×(Wage>PBGC)
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.15 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19
Fixed-Eﬀects
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Airline No Yes No No No No
Plan No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of airlines 12 12 12 12 12 12
# of plans 46 46 46 46 46 46
Observations 470 470 470 470 470 470
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